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Abstract 
Time discounting is at the heart of economic decision-making. We disentangle hyperbolic discounting 
from subjective time perception using experimental data from incentive-compatible tests to measure 
time preferences, and a set of experimental tasks to measure time perception. The two behavioural 
parameters may be related to two factors that affect how we look ahead to future events. The first is 
that some component of time preferences reflect hyperbolic discounting. The second factor is that 
non-constant discounting may also be a reflection of subjective time perception: if people’s perception 
of time follows a near logarithmic process (as all other physiological perceptions such as heat, sound, 
and light do) then all existing estimates of individual discounting will be mis-measured and 
incorrectly suggest “hyperbolic” discounting, even if discounting over subjective time is constant. To 
test these hypotheses, we empirically estimate the two distinct behavioural parameter s using data 
collected from 178 participants to an experiment conducted at the London School of Economics 
Behavioural Research Lab. The results support the hypothesis that apparent non-constant discounting 
is largely a reflection of subjective time perception. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Time   discounting   is   considered   a   fundamental   characteristic   of   human   decision-­‐‑
making.   (Frederick,  Loewenstein  et   al.   2002)     For   example,  higher   rates  of  discounting  
will   lead   an   individual   to   more   strongly   shift   consumption   to   the   present,   implying  
lower   savings   rates   –   a   regularity   that   has   both   individual   and   macro-­‐‑economic  
implications.   (Ameriks,  Caplin   et   al.   2007)   Individuals  with  higher  discount   rates  may  
also  be  less  willing  to  invest  in  painful  activities  in  the  present  (such  as  preventive  health  
care   or   stopping   the   use   of   some   addictive   good   with   long-­‐‑term   negative   health  
consequences)  even  if  such  investments  yield  substantial  benefits  in  the  future  (Barsky,  
Juster   et   al.   1997;   Chapman   and   Coups   1999;   Bernheim   and   Rangel   2004;   Chabris,  
Laibson  et  al.  2008;  Sutter,  Kocher  et  al.  2011).    
Multiple  empirical  methods  have  been  developed  over  the  past  decades  to  estimate  
individual   levels  of  discounting,  ranging  from  real-­‐‑world  natural  experiments  (Warner  
and  Pleeter  2001);  to  survey  questions  involving  hypothetical  payouts  (van  der  Pol  and  
Cairns  2001);   to   laboratory  or  “artefactual   field”  experiments   (in   the   sense  of  Harrison  
and  List,  2004),  mainly  using  incentive-­‐‑compatible  methods  (Coller  and  Williams  1999;  
Harrison,  Lau  et  al.  2002;  Andersen,  Harrison  et  al.  2008).      
Perhaps  the  most  widely  debated  finding  in  the  literature  is  that  individuals  do  not  
appear   to   discount   the   future   at   a   constant   rate:   discount   rates   are   higher   for   more  
proximate  time  periods  and  lower  for  more  distal  ones.  (Thaler  1981;  Benzion,  Rapoport  
et  al.  1989;  Horowitz  1991;  Kirby  and  Marakovic  1995;  Coller,  Harrison  et  al.  2012)  This  
phenomenon   has   been   typically   explained   in   terms   of   hyperbolic   or   quasi-­‐‑hyperbolic  
time   discounting.   (Loewenstein   and   Prelec   1992;   Laibson   1997;   Gul   and   Pesendorfer  
2001;  Rubinstein  2003;  Benhabib,  Bisin  et  al.  2010)    
Several  alternative  accounts  have  been  proposed  to  explain  hyperbolic  discounting.  
Ainslie   (1975)   relates   it   to   individual   impulsivity,   whereas   Loewenstein   (1996)   to   the  
tempting  influence  and  temporal  proximity  of  “visceral  factors”  such  as  hunger,  sexual  
arousal,   cravings,   and   physical   pain.(Ainslie   1975;   Loewenstein   1996)   Trope   and  
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Liberman  (2003,  2010)  point  to  different  representations  of  near  and  distant  future  events  
in   terms   of   cognitive   concreteness.   (Trope   and   Liberman   2003;   Trope   and   Liberman  
2010)    Others  argue  that  declining  discounting  rates  could  be  also  due  to  “sub-­‐‑additive  
discounting”:   the   fact   that   the  overall   time  horizon   is  partitioned   into  subintervals  can  
increase  the  salience  of  the  partitioned  time  components,  and  lead  to  higher  discounting.  
(Read   2001;   Trope   and   Liberman   2003;   Scholten   and   Read   2006;   Trope   and   Liberman  
2010;   Dohmen,   Falk   et   al.   2012)      Frederick,   Loewenstein,   and   O’Donoghue   (2002)  
observe   that,   as   future   payouts   are   inextricably   associated   with   uncertainty,   our  
valuation  of  inter-­‐‑temporal  trade-­‐‑offs  not  only  depends  on  our  “pure”  time  preferences,  
but   also   on   perceived   risks   associated  with   the   delay.   Epper,   Fehr-­‐‑Duda,   and   Bruhin  
find,   in   fact,   that   hyperbolic   discounting   is   significantly   associated   with   non-­‐‑linear  
probability   weighting   in   the   subjective   perception   of   probabilities   (“sub-­‐‑
proportionality”).   (Epper,  Fehr-­‐‑Duda  et  al.  2011)     Andersen,  and  colleagues  notice   that  
most   incentive-­‐‑compatible   evidence   of   hyperbolic   discounting   occurs   in   samples   of  
college   students   and   hardly   apply   to   real   money   choices   of   adult   respondents   over  
typical  horizons  of  months.(Andersen,  Harrison  et  al.  2011)      
There  is  a  separate  branch  of  the  literature  that  suggests  that  the  observed  behavior  
may  be  less  based  in  inconsistencies  in  actual  time  preferences  than  in  perceptions  about  
time   duration.   (Read   2001;   Takahashi   2005;   Zauberman,   Kim   et   al.   2009)   The  
implications   of   this   (which  we  will   explain   below)   is   that,   if   human  understanding   of  
time  –  either  retrospectively  or  projected  forward  in  time  –  is  not  a  linear  mapping  from  
calendar  time  (e.g.,  if  two  years  are  perceived  as  less  than  twice  as  far  away  as  one  year)  
then  we  have  made  an  error   in  our   fundamental   assumptions  when  calculating  upper  
and   lower   bounds   of   the   discount   rates   in   past   empirical   studies.   That   people  would  
perceive   time   in   this   manner   can   be   explained   by   appeal   to   what   is   known   as   the  
“Weber-­‐‑Fechner  Law”   –   a   fundamental  principle   in   the  psychology  of  perception   that  
has  been  widely  documented  for  other  neuro-­‐‑physiological  stimuli  such  as  heat,  sound,  
and  light  (Stevens,  1957).      
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In   this   paper,   we   explore   these   questions   and   bring   the   multiple   strands   of   the  
existing   literature   closer   together   in   one   incentive-­‐‑compatible   experiment  whereby  we  
simultaneously   estimate   individual’s   subjective   perception   of   time   and   their   implied  
discount   rates.   We   improve   on   existing   studies   in   at   least   five   ways,   including:   i)  
explicitly  accounting   for   subjective   time  perception  when  calculating  upper  and   lower  
bounds   on   discount   rates;   ii)   measuring   within-­‐‑person   changes   to   perceptions   and  
discounting;   iii)   taking   “now”   versus   “later”  more   seriously;   iv)   using   information   on  
immediate  time-­‐‑perception  errors;  and  v)  minimizing  the  potential  for  framing  effects.      
We  find  that   individuals  do  indeed  compress  future  time  perceptions  in  ways  very  
reminiscent   of   the   general  Weber-­‐‑Fechner   principle.   Further,   once   that   compression   is  
taken  into  account,  we  find  evidence  that  discount  rates  are  higher  for  today  versus  later  
times,  but  essentially  constant  and  statistically  undistinguishable  for  all  later  times  from  
one   week   onwards.   While   discounting   rates   based   on   “objective   time”   replicate   the  
usual  hyperbolic  preferences,  much  of   the  hyperbolic  pattern   is   absent   in   the   curve  of  
the   discounting   factors   obtained   from   “subjective   time”.   Thus,  we   argue   that   there   is  
good   reason   to   suspect   that  much  of   the  worry   about   hyperbolic-­‐‑like  discounting   is   a  
case  of  “getting  the  math  wrong”:  rather  that  questioning  whether  there  are  widespread  
time-­‐‑inconsistencies,  we  should  focus  on  the  implications  of  compression  of  future  time  
perception.      
The   rest   of   the   article   is   structured   as   follows.   In   Section   2   we   review   the  
background,  the  objectives,  and  the  main  features  of  our  study,  and  its  contributions  to  
the   literature.   Section   3   describes   the   experiment,   while   in   Section   4   we   present   the  
econometric  model.   Section   5  discusses   the   results,  while   in   Section   6  we   conclude  by  
discussing  some  of  the  implications  of  our  findings.  
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2.  BACKGROUND  AND  CONTRIBUTIONS  
2.1.  THE  DISCOUNTING  FUNCTION  
As   reviewed  by  Frederick,  Loewenstein,   and  O’Donoghue   (Frederick,  Loewenstein  
et  al.  2002),  the  study  of  intertemporal  choice  has  a  long  and  fascinating  tradition  in  the  
history   of   economics.   It   is   useful   to   follow   their   conceptual   distinction   between   “time  
discounting”,   which   includes   any   reason   for   caring   less   about   a   future   outcome,   and  
“time   preference”,   which   refers,   more   specifically,   to   the   “pure”   preference   for  
immediate   over   delayed   utility.   In   the   early   economists’   views,   time   discounting  was  
thought  as  an  amalgamation  of  disparate  psychological  motives,  which  can  explain  why  
even  now  it  overlaps  with  different  concepts  in  psychology,  such  as  lack  of  self-­‐‑control  
and  impulsiveness.  (Patton  and  Stanford  1995;  Zakay  and  Block  1997;  Kirby,  Petry  et  al.  
1999)  
The  basic  modern   theoretical   approach   in   economics,   however,  was   introduced  by  
Paul   Samuelson.   (Samuelson   1947)   His   discounted   utility   (DU)   model   assumed   that  
individuals  maximize   the   present   value   of   a   stream  of   separate   utilities,  where   future  
utilities   were   weighted   less   heavily   compared   to   the   current   level   of   utility.      Thus  
individuals  were  assumed  to  select  some  level  of  consumption  in  each  time  period,  xt,  in  
order  to  maximize  
(1)     
  
subject  to  an  income/wealth  constraint.    In  Samuelson’s  model  the  weighting  factor,  β(t)  
was   constant   across   all   time   periods   in   this   model,   and   corresponded   to   the   most  
common   economic   understanding   of   a   “discount   rate”   in   that   the   rate   of   discounting  
future  periods  is  invariant  to  the  distance  of  time  t  in  the  future.  Generally,  β(t)  has  the  
form:  




















which  implies  an  exponential  discount  rate  that  is  constant  for  all  time  periods.  
For   several   decades   after   Samuelson’s   work,   the   DU   model   was   the   standard  
conceptual   basis   for   economists’   understanding   of   inter-­‐‑temporal   choice.      In   the   early  
1990s,   however,   a   body   of   psychometric   and   (what   came   to   be   called)   behavioral  
economics   literature   developed   –   based   in   part   on   work   from   the   middle   of   the   20th  
century   (Strotz   1955)   –   that   suggested   such   a   “constant   discount   rate”   view   was  
mistaken      (Ainslie  1991;  Ainslie  and  Haslam  1992;  Loewenstein  and  Prelec  1992;  Kirby  
and  Marakovic  1995;  Laibson  1997).  In  this  formulation,  the  discount  function  takes  the  
form:  
(3)     
  
Functionally,   this   implies  that  the  rate  of  change  in  β(t)   (i.e.,   the  derivative  of  β(t)  with  
respect  to  time)  declines  as  t  increases  –  that  is,  that  individual’s  rate  of  discounting  for  
consumption   delayed   until   tomorrow   is   larger   than   the   rate   of   discounting   for  
consumption   that   must   be   delayed   by   a   day   one   year   from   now.      Behaviorally,   this  
implies   that   people’s   preferences   are   time-­‐‑inconsistent:   given   some   return   on   delay,   a  
person   may   want   to   shift   consumption   to   the   present   from   tomorrow,   even   though  
when  planning  for  tomorrow  she  will  want  to  delay  that  same  consumption  until  a  later  
time.   Naturally,   such   systematic   inconsistencies   are   problematic   for   neoclassical  
economists   (which   only   serves   to   increase   the   idea’s   attractiveness   to   behavioral  
economists).  
  
2.2.  DEFINING  THE  FIRST  PERIOD  
   Empirically,  non-­‐‑constant  discounting   rates  have  been   found  quite   commonly,  and  
we  refer  to  the  existing  reviews  for  a  comprehensive  discussion  of  this  broad  literature.  
(Coller  and  Williams  1999;  Frederick,  Loewenstein  et  al.  2002;  Andersen,  Harrison  et  al.  











pure   hyperbolic   is   the   “quasi-­‐‑hyperbolic”   form  popularized   in   economics   by   Laibson.  
(Laibson   1997)   The   basic   logic   of   this   framework   is   that   people  discount   the   future   in  
discrete   ways,   where   the   first   period   is   essentially   undiscounted   and   all   subsequent  
periods   are   discounted   in   an   increasing   level   (with   or   without   a   constant   rate).      The  
observational  consequences  are  that  the  discount  function  mimics  many  of  the  traits  of  a  
hyperbolic  discounting   function   (hence   the  “quasi-­‐‑”),   though   this   is  driven  entirely  by  
the  greater  weight  to  first-­‐‑period  utility  compared  with  all  other  periods.  
   This   Strotz-­‐‑Ainslie-­‐‑Laibson   framework   is   appealing.   In   many   ways,   however,   the  
most  appealing  aspect  of  the  idea  is  typically  ignored  in  empirical  applications  –  namely  
that   the   first  period   is  different   from  subsequent  periods.     Even  empirical  applications  
that  do  explicitly  model  quasi-­‐‑hyperbolic  behaviors  do  not  directly  solve  the  first  period  
question.   So,   the   first   unresolved   question   here   is:   what   should   be   considered   as   the  
“first”  period?  Or,  equivalently,  when  the   line  should  be  drawn  to  separate   the  “near”  
from  the  “far”  future?  (Ebert  and  Prelec  2007)  
   The   quasi-­‐‑hyperbolic   model   itself   is   silent   about   this   question.   (Loewenstein   and  
Prelec  1992;  Prelec  2004)  In  the  literature  the  first  period  is  typically  equated  to  the  first  
year   (Frederick,   Loewenstein,   and   O’Donoghue,   2002).   In   the   experimental   literature  
with  real  incentives,  period  1  is  usually  as  proximate  as  six  months  (Harrison,  Lau  and  
Williams,   2002),   two   months   (Coller   and   Williams,   1999),   one   month   (Andersen,  
Harrison,   Lau,   and   Rutström,   2008),   or   2   weeks   (Andersen,   Harrison,   Lau,   and  
Rutström,  2011),  although  occasionally  time  horizons  of   few  days  are  used.   (Kirby  and  
Marakovic  1995;  Coller  and  Williams  1999;  Frederick,  Loewenstein  et  al.  2002;  Andersen,  
Harrison   et   al.   2011)  Also   in   the   studies   exploring   subjective   time  perception,   the   first  
time  horizon  is  usually  three  months.    (Kim  and  Zauberman  2009;  Zauberman,  Kim  et  al.  
2009)  
   The   original   hypothesis   supporting   hyperbolic   preferences,   however,   assumed   the  
source  of  the  behaviors  was  competition  between  two  internal  systems  –  an  automatic,  
impulsive,  and  myopic  self  (often  referred  to  as  “System  1”)  and  a  controlled,  conscious,  
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and  more  farsighted  self  (often  referred  to  as  “System  2”).  (Tversky  and  Kahneman  1974;  
Thaler   and   Shefrin   1981;   Tversky   and   Kahneman   1981;   Chaiken   and   Trope   1999;  
Kahneman  2003)  Such  notions  would  appear  to  have  a  strong  evolutionary  basis.  If  we  
consider   how   such   an   evolutionary   conflict  would   be   plausibly   established,  we  might  
suspect  that  the  “first  period”  is  considerably  closer  than  few  months  or  weeks  away.  If  
a  group  of  ancient  ancestors  came  into  contact  with  a  food  source,  then  survival  may  be  
enhanced   by   gathering   and   eating   it   soon   (certainly   for   perishable   sources):   in   very  
primitive  settings  waiting  until  tomorrow  to  consume  may  mean  the  food  source  is  first  
eaten  by  a  competitor.    
   Thus,  if  there  is  some  internal  conflict  driving  temporal  decisions,  we  may  anticipate  
that   they   show   up   when   comparing   today   (literally)   with   any   other   time   period.  
Considering   a   one-­‐‑day   “first”   period   would   be   consistent   with   the   observation   that  
periods   of   time   beyond   that   are   treated   as   categorically   different   also   for   biological  
reasons:   the   circadian   clock,   in   fact,   regulates   basic   aspects   of   human   physiology   and  
behavior,  and  is  synchronized  by  the  natural  periodicity  of  light,  so  that  a  24-­‐‑hours  cycle  
is  likely  to  be  perceived  as  a  special  duration.  (Wittmann  and  Paulus  2009)  
   We   designed   our   experiment   with   an   eye   toward   testing   the   implications   of   this  
today  vs.   all   later   time  hypothesis  more   closely   than   is   typically  done.  We  assess   time  
preferences  (and,  as  discussed  below,  time  duration  perception)  by  comparing  subjects’  
tradeoffs   between   today   and:   tomorrow,   one   week,   one   month,   three   months,   six  
months,   and   one   year,   using   an   overlapping   design   (OD).      Thus,   we   are   able   to  
distinguish   between   a   “now   versus   any   time   in   the   future”   conflict   and   a   traditional  
“continuously  declining  discount  rate”  hyperbolic  framework.  
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2.3.  ACCOMMODATING  NON-­‐‑LINEAR  SUBJECTIVE  TIME  
   A   second   –   and   perhaps   more   important   –   problem   with   the   general   economic  
literature  estimating  individual  rates  of  discounting  arises  from  the  difference  between  
what  people  think  when  we  ask  them  to  compare  today  to  one  month  and  when  we  ask  
them  to  compare  today  to  two  months.  Economists  (naturally  enough)  assume  that  the  
individuals  will  then  consider  tradeoffs  across  two  periods,  one  of  which  is  exactly  twice  
as   far   away   as   the   other.      However,   there   is   good   reason   to   be   skeptical   about   this  
assumption.  
   Ernst   Weber   proposed   in   the   early   1800s   that   people’s   senses   do   not   function  
linearly.   (Weber   1978)   This   fundamental   idea   was   subsequently   expanded   by   Gustav  
Fechner  in  the  mid-­‐‑1800s,  and  has  come  to  be  seen  as  one  of  the  basic  principles  of  the  
psychology  of  perception.    Essentially,  the  Weber-­‐‑Fechner  law  states  that  the  minimum  
detectible  difference  between  two  levels  of  a  stimulus  is  proportional  to  the  percentage  
change  in  the  input.     Thus,  the  perceived  difference,  dp,  between  two  stimuli,  S0  and  S  
(e.g.,  the  intensity  of  heat)  are:  
  
Integrating   this   relationship,   solving   for   the   constant   of   integration,   and   rearranging  
yields:  
  
In  other  words,  the  perception  of  a  stimulus  is  proportional  to  the  log  of  the  change  in  
the  actual  stimulus.  (Bruss  and  Ruschendorf  2010)    
   The  Weber-­‐‑Fechner   principle   has   been   widely   documented   for   a   range   of   neuro-­‐‑
physiological   perceptions,   such   as   heat,   sound,   and   light.  Abstract   constructs,   such   as  
numbers,   appear   to   also   induce   logarithmic   relationships   between   stimulus   and  
perception,  even  among  non-­‐‑human  subjects.  (Dehaene  2003)  Thus,  this  non-­‐‑linearity  in  
dp = k dSS .








subjective  experiences  relative  to  the  objective  stimulus  appears  universal  and  operating  
at   a   biological   level.   More   recently,   evidence   is   growing   that   the   Weber-­‐‑Fechner  
principle  may  be   important   also   for   human   subjective  perception   of   time.   (Read   2001;  
Takahashi  2005;  Wittmann  and  Paulus  2008;  Zauberman,  Kim  et  al.  2009)    
   If  this  principle  does  extend  to  how  long  people  perceive  time,  this  would  present  a  
fundamental   problem   in   the   empirical   measurement   of   individual   discount   rates  
conducted  to  date.    After  all,  often  we  do  not  have  access  to  “objective  time”,  especially  
prospectively,   and   we   can   only   access   our   subjective   perception   of   how   long   a   time  
interval  was,  or  will  be.    
   This   means   that   as   we   ask   subjects   about   longer   time   frames,   people   may   well  
perceive   the   differences   to   be   less   than  we   assume:   for   instance,   two  months  may   be  
perceived   to   be   less   than   twice   one   month.   Thus,   we   may   expect   that   when   our  
experimental   subjects   hear   questions   about   getting   something   in   30   days   vs.   60   days,  
they  may  be  really  making  their  choices  using  time  frames  of  f(30)  and  f(60),  where  f(  .  )  
reflects  their  subjective  perception  of  how  long  30  and  60  days  are.  It  may  well  be  the  case  
that  for  some  respondents  f(60)  <  2*f(30),  so  that  they  perceive  more  vividly  the  duration  
of   the   time   periods   which   are   close   to   the   present.   If   this   is   the   case,   then   nearly   all  
estimates   of   individual   discount   rates   in   the   past   could   be   mis-­‐‑calculated.   We   will  
explicitly  illustrate  this  point  in  the  next  sub-­‐‑section.  
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2.4.  ESTIMATING   DISCOUNT   RATES   AND   THE   IMPLICATIONS   OF   NON-­‐‑LINEAR  
SUBJECTIVE  TIME  
The  empirical  economic  literature  which  estimates  discount  rates  for  individuals  can  
be   divided   generally   into   three   groups:   research   that   takes   advantage   of   natural  
experiments;   research   that   uses   surveys   for   eliciting   discount   rates;   and   research  
utilizing   laboratory-­‐‑based  or  “artefactual   field”  experiments.  Other  articles   review   this  
literature   in  great  detail.   (Frederick,  Loewenstein  et  al.   2002;  MacKillop,  Amlung  et  al.  
2011)     We  will   only   highlight   a   few   archetypical   examples   of   this   broad   literature   in  
order  to  motivate  the  research  we  propose.  
The   first   approach   mentioned   is   to   use   natural   experiments   in   which   individuals  
must   choose   between   alternatives   with   differential   time   dimensions,   such   that   a  
discount  rate  can  be  inferred.    An  example  of  this  literature  is  Warner  and  Pleeter’s  work  
(Warner   and   Pleeter   2001),   which   took   advantage   of   data   generated   from   an   early  
retirement  program  in  the  U.S.  military  to  estimate  discount  rates  for  enlisted  men  and  
officers.     Retirees  were  required  to  decide  whether   to   take   their  retirement  benefit  as  a  
lump-­‐‑sum   or   as   an   annuity   payment.      The   value   of   each   depended   on   rank,   years   of  
service,  and  other  factors.    Since  the  retirees  were  choosing  between  an  immediate  and  a  
delayed  payout  which  had  a  fixed  rate  of  return,  it  is  possible  to  use  that  information  to  
infer  the  strength  of  preference  for  the  present  versus  the  future  (i.e.,  the  discount  rate)  
of  the  retirees.    Warner  and  Pleeter  estimate  discount  rates  in  the  25%  per  year  range  for  
officers  and  in  the  45%  per  year  range  for  enlisted  men.  Other  researchers  have  used  this  
method   (existing  data   from  natural   experiments)   to   estimate   individual   level  discount  
rates,  and  find  similar  results   (Hausmann  1979;  Gately  1980;  Pender  1996).  Some  other  
studies  using  natural  experiments,  however,  find  much  lower  rates  of  discount  (Moore  
and  Viscusi  1990),  and  in  general  the  literature  also  discusses  the  difficulties  of  making  
robust  inferences  from  naturally  occurring  data.    (Harrison  2005)  
A   second   methodology   employed   is   to   present   survey   subjects   with   a   set   of  
hypothetical  present  and  future  payouts  –  often  by  asking  respondents  to  imagine  they  
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have  won  a  lottery  and  hypothetically  choosing  an  immediate  vs.  delayed  payout;  these  
studies   estimate  discount   rates  using   a   contingent  valuation   (CV)  method  based  upon  
respondent  answers.    Questions  of  this  sort  can  be  found  in  the  2004  wave  of  the  Health  
and  Retirement   Survey,   for   example.   These   large-­‐‑scale   survey   questions   typically   lack  
real   monetary   payouts,   although   attempts   have   been   recently  made   to   use   incentive-­‐‑
compatible  tests  within  households  surveys.  (Tanaka,  Camerer  et  al.  2010;  Galizzi,  2012)  
There  are  a  number  of   studies   that  utilize   the   survey  method  and   the  usual   finding   is  
that  estimated  discount  rates  are  generally  in  the  range  of  10-­‐‑30%  a  year,  although  with  
some   figures   also   in   the   region   of   hundreds   percent   a   year   (Moore   and  Viscusi   1988;  
Chapman   and  Winquist   1989;   Redelmeir   and  Heller   1993;  Chapman   and  Elstein   1995;  
Wahlund   and   Gunnarsson   1996;   Cairns   and   van   der   Pol   1997;   Johannesson   and  
Johansson  1997;  Holden,  Shiferaw  et  al.  1998;  Hesketh  2000;  van  der  Pol  and  Cairns  2001;  
Bradford  2010;  Bradford,  Zoller  et  al.  2010;  Bradford  and  Burgess  2011).  
The  third  methodology  is  to  present  individuals  with  payouts  that  vary  in  their  time  
dimension   in   a   lab-­‐‑based   experimental   setting.      There   are   numerous   examples   of  
experimental   methods   used   to   assess   individual   discount   rates   (Cairns   1994;   Green,  
Fristoe   et   al.   1994;   Dolan   and   Gudex   1995;   Kirby   and   Marakovic   1995;   Coller   and  
Williams  1999;  Andersen,  Harrison  et  al.  2008).  A  preliminary  distinction  can  be  made  
between  studies  that  use  hypothetical  amounts  and  scenarios,  from  the  ones  that  employ  
incentive-­‐‑compatible   tests  with   real  monetary   payments.   The   key   distinction   between  
these   approaches   is   related   to   the   concern   that,   absent   real   monetary   incentives,  
respondents  may   not   consider   their   questions   carefully   enough.  Collier   and  Williams’  
work  (Coller  and  Williams  1999)  represents  perhaps  the  first  well-­‐‑known  example  of  an  
incentive-­‐‑compatible   study.   In   this   study,   the  authors  offered   their   subjects  payouts  of  
real  money   under   controlled   laboratory   settings.   They   estimated   rates   in   the   20%   per  
year   range.      The   approach   taken   by   Coller   and   Williams,   and   further   developed   by  
Harrison,  Lau,  and  Williams  (2002),  Andersen,  Harrison,  Lau,  and  Rutström  (2008),  and  
others,  has  become  the  standard  method  to  elicit  and  estimate  time  preferences  with  real  
monetary   incentives.      Alternative   elicitation   procedures   have   been   recently   proposed.    
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(Andreoni  and  Sprenger  2012)    A  number  of  shortcomings  remain  in  the  method,  which  
we  propose  addressing  in  this  study.  
Consider  the  typical  methodology  of  these  studies.    Figure  1  is  a  reproduction  of  the  
Table   from   Coller   and   William   (1999)   that   contained   their   experimental   test.    
Respondents   were   presented  with   options   to   choose   between   two   different  monetary  
payouts   –   either   in   one  month   or   in   3  months   –   and   asked   to   choose   in   each   row   the  
option   that   would   be   preferred.      The   logic   of   the   method   is   that   if   a   person   has   a  
personal  discount  rate  of,  say,  5.5%  per  year,  then  they  will  prefer  Option  A  for  the  first  
four  rows  of  the  experiment,  and  Option  B  for  row  five  and  every  row  thereafter.    Thus,  
while  the  econometrician  cannot  know  the  discount  rate  is  5.5%,  she  can  know  that  it  is  
bounded   by   5.13%   below   and   7.79%   above.      After   that,   the   econometric  methods   are  
typically  simple  grouped  or  interval  regression;  ordered  probit  using  the  information  on  
the  upper  and  lower  bounds;  non-­‐‑linear  least  squares;  or  “structural”  estimation  of  the  
latent  parameters  in  the  utility  functions  using  maximum-­‐‑likelihood  methods.  
The  difficulty  arises  in  how  the  econometrician  arrives  at  the  specific  values  for  the  
upper   and   lower   bounds.      Economically,   of   course,   the   answer   is   clear:   a   person  will  
choose  the  proximate  payoff  if  the  present  value  of  that  is  higher  than  the  present  value  
of  the  future  payoff  amount,  given  her  discount  rate.    If  we  use  the  basic  framework  in  
Figure  1,  but  assume  Option  A  is  for  an  immediate  payout  rather  than  one  month  away  
(which   merely   simplifies   the   illustration,   without   changing   the   basic   point),   then   we  
know  the  respondent  would  choose  Option  A  iff  
(4)     
where  d  is  the  respondent’s  daily  discount  rate.    Using  this  logic,  the  econometrician  will  
infer  that  the  upper  and  lower  bounds  can  be  calculated  using  the  relationship  
(5)     
500 > 501.67
(1+ d)60365











Note   that   this   calculation   –   which,   one   way   or   another,   underlies   all   empirical  
estimation  of  discount  rates  published  to  date  –  require  that  the  respondent  be  thinking  
“60  days”  when  making  the  implicit  calculation  that  permits  her  to  provide  an  answer  to  
which   option   is   preferred.      If,   on   the   other   hand,   some   version   of   the  Weber-­‐‑Fechner  
effect  is  in  play,  the  respondent  cannot  actually  think  “60  days”  when  choosing  options  
for  the  rows  in  Figure  1.  Rather,  she  is  imagining  her  subjective  perception  of  how  long  
60  days  actually  is:  f(60).    Thus,  the  econometrician  should  be  calculating  the  upper  and  
lower  bounds  based  on  the  subjective  rather  than  objective  time,  using  
(6)        
More  generally,  without  reference  to  the  specific  values  from  Figure  1,  the  lower  bound  
for  the  daily  discount  rate  should  be  calculated  as  
(7)     
and  not  (5)  -­‐‑  with  the  obvious  shift  for  the  upper  bound.     Thus,  the  traditional  bounds  
using  (6)  may  simply  be  mis-­‐‑measured.    
Notice  the  close  relation  between  the  discounting  rate  function  in  (7)  and  the  several  
operational   specifications   of   hyperbolic   discounting   reflecting   time   perception   as  
discussed  in  Andersen,  Harrison,  Lau,  and  Rutström  (2011):  in  particular,  the  “Weibull”  
specification  originally  proposed  by  Read  (Read  2001);  its  general  functional  form  due  to  
Roelofsma   (Roelofsma  1996);   the  “Constant  Sensitivity”   (CS)  power   function  proposed  
by  Prelec  (Prelec  2004;  Ebert  and  Prelec,  2007);  and  a  variety  of  others  (Takahashi,  Oono,  
and  Radford,   2008;   Bleichrodt,  Rodhe,   and  Wakker,   2009;  Kim  and  Zauberman,   2009).  
The  key  difference  with   those  specifications   is   that   the  discounting  rate   function   in   (7)  
does   not   a   priori   impose   any   specific   functional   form   for   the   shape   of   the   individual  























perception   of   time,   and,   rather,   it   directly   infers   it   from   the   data   from   each   subject’s  
responses.  
In  particular,   if   the   function   f(t)   is  non-­‐‑linear   and   reasonably   logarithmic   in   shape,  
then   this   measurement   error   could   produce   estimated   discount   rates   that   appear  
hyperbolic   –   even   when   underlying   time   preferences   for   all   periods   “not   today”   are  
actually   constant.      Our   goal   in   this   paper   is   to   assess   the   degree   to   which   such  mis-­‐‑
measurement   occurs   and   determine   whether   it   contributes   at   all   to   the   hyperbolic  
discounting  behaviors  observed  so  commonly  in  the  past.  
  
2.5.    WHAT  WE  WILL  CONTRIBUTE  
   Our  experiment  seeks  to  contribute  to  the  literature  in  five  main  ways.  
   First,  we  will  assess  individual  subjective  perception  of  time  in  a  way  that  will  allow  
us   to   estimate   the   function   f(t)   in   Equation   (7)   above,   and   so   correctly   estimate   the  
bounds  on  each  respondent’s  revealed  discount  rate.    We  will  do  this  by  asking  people  
to   indicate   on   a   line   (which   is   152  mm   in   length)   how   far   away   they   believe   six   time  
durations  are  (e.g.  one  day,  one  week,  four  weeks,  thirteen  weeks,  26  weeks,  52  weeks).  
We  later  ask  them  to  make  binary  choices  as  in  Figure  1  using  the  same  intervals.    This  
information   will   allow   us   to   estimate   f(t),   and   thereby   estimate   the   subjective   days  
associated  with  each  objective  (calendar)  delay.    In  and  of  itself,  the  method  is  not  novel.    
At   least   two   other   studies   have   used   a   similar   approach,   one  where   the   interval  was  
fixed   as   in   our   experiment   (Zauberman,   Kim   et   al.   2009)   and   one   computer-­‐‑assisted  
design  where  the  interval  was  essentially  open  ended  (Kim  and  Zauberman  2009),  both  
approaches  yielding  essentially  identical  results.    Neither  study,  however,  has  examined  
1)  substantial  within-­‐‑person  variation  in  the  perception  of  more  than  two  time  frames;  or  
2)   time   frames   short   enough   to   plausibly   evaluate   hyperbolic   versus   quasi-­‐‑hyperbolic  
behaviors  (three  months  was  the  shortest  evaluated  frame).  
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   We   particularly   want   to   contrast   the   experimental   design   and   empirical   strategy  
employed   by   Zauberman,   Kim,   Malkoc,   and   Bettman   (2009)   with   the   design   of   our  
study.     Zauberman   and   coauthors   do  not   fully   address   our   questions   for   at   least   four  
reasons.   First,   they   do   not   employ   any   incentive-­‐‑compatible   payments   in   the  
experimental   tests   to   elicit   time   preferences,   but   instead   rely   on   purely   hypothetical  
questions.   In   contrast,   our   experimental   tests   are   incentive-­‐‑compatible.   Second,   the  
evidence   on   subjective   time   perception   presented   by   Zauberman,   Kim,   Malkoc,   and  
Bettman  (2009)  is  mostly  based  on  between-­‐‑subjects  results,  so  that  they  do  not  have  two  
points  in  the  horizontal  line  for  the  same  subject  in  the  time  perception  task.  Third,  the  
questions  for  the  12  and  36  months  time  frames  in  the  same  subjective  time  perception  
task   is   arbitrarily   “anchored”   to   the   average   level   of   the   3  months   treatment   -­‐‑   not   the  
individual   level,   nor   the   level   for   an   appropriate   one-­‐‑day   treatment   -­‐‑   so   the   left   end  
point  of  the  horizontal  line  (“now”)  essentially  works  as  a  population  average  reference  
point.   Finally,   the   empirical   analysis   does   not   explicitly   fit   any   time   discounting  
function,  neither  with  objective  nor  subjective  time.      
   Our   second   contribution   to   the   literature   is   that   we   designed   the   experiment   to  
capture  within-­‐‑person  changes  in  subjective  time.    Each  person  was  asked  to  assess  the  
subjective   distance   of   all   six   time   frames   and   then   make   discount-­‐‑related   choices  
between  lottery  payments  today  versus  each  of  those  six  time  delays.    This  allows  us  to  
rescale   the   responses   so   that   individual   heterogeneity   in   the   implied   subjective   time  
scales  are  normalized  out  –  permitting  straightforward  cross-­‐‑person  comparisons.  
   Third,   we   asked   about   time   frames   that   plausibly   span   the   range   where   an  
evolutionary   theory   of   preferences   might   suggest   “present   day”   effects   all   the   way  
through   a   time   frame   long   enough   in   the   future   to   be   near   the   point  where   discount  
rates  stop  falling  under  the  traditional  hyperbolic  preferences  hypotheses.    Thus,  we  ask  
respondents   to  evaluate   today  compared  to:   tomorrow,  one  week,   four  weeks,   thirteen  
weeks,  26  weeks  and  52  weeks.  
 16 
   Fourth,   we   explicitly   investigate   the   effect   on   choice   consistency   of   “broken”  
sequences   of   time   preferences   questions.   Frederick,   Loewenstein,   and   O’Donoghue,  
(2002)  have  discussed  an  “anchoring”  effect  potentially  occurring  when  respondents  are  
asked   to  make   a   sequence   of   choices   between   a   “Smaller-­‐‑Sooner”   (SS)   and   a   “Larger-­‐‑
Later”   (LL)   reward,  with   the   first   faced   choice   biasing   subsequent   choices.   Andersen,  
Harrison,  Lau,  and  Rutström  (2011)  have  explored  the  effect  of  presenting  subjects  time  
preferences  questions  in  either  an  ascending  or  a  descending  order  of  time  horizons  (i.e.  
from  2  weeks  to  12  months,  or  the  other  way  around),  and  found  that  using  ascending  
time  horizons  leads  to  a  decrease  of  about  2.3%  in  the  implicit  discounting  rates.  In  both  
their   treatments,  however,  within   each   time  horizon  block,   the   list   of   time  preferences  
questions   were   presented   in   an   unbroken   increasing   order   of   the   amounts   of   money  
paid   in   the  LL  option,   that   is,   in  an  ascending  order  of   implicit  discounting  rates.  One  
potential  concern  about  the  method  of  asking  people  to  choose  Option  A  (SS)  or  Option  
B  (LL)  in  a  series  of  questions  with  the  usual  presentation  as  in  Figure  1  is  that  one  may  
expect  people   to  realize   that  once  they  switch  from  Option  A  to  Option  B,   it  would  be  
inconsistent   to   switch   back.   That   is   -­‐‑   one   may   wonder   -­‐‑   the   series   of   binary   choices  
framed   in   an  unbroken  ascending  order  of   implicit  discounting   rates  may   in  principle  
impose   consistency   in   choices   where   there   is   none   in   reality.   To   assess   the   extent   to  
which   respondents   make   genuinely   consistent   choices,   we   broke   our   six   discounting  
choice   tables   into   individual   rows,   and   presented   all   the   choices   in   random   order,  
alternating  pairs  differing  both  for  time  delays  and  implicit  discounting  rates,  so  that  as  
they   answer   the   question   respondents   would   be   unable   to   detect   whether   they   were  
being  consistent  or  not.  Next,  we  also  presented  our  subjective  time  questions  in  random  
order   (four   weeks   was   asked   first).   (Appendix   A   has   examples   of   our   time   frame  
questions.)    
   Our   fifth   contribution   to   the   literature   is   to   introduce   a   measure   of   recall   time  
dilation   over   the   short   term,   which   can   be   used   as   an   instrument   in   identifying   the  
subjective   time   function   from   the  discount   rate   function.     Respondents   sat   in   their   lab  
cubicles   in   a   basement   room   without   windows   or   clocks,   and   all   watches   and   cell  
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phones   were   taken   prior   to   entry   in   the   room.      Thus,   participants   had   no   objective  
(external)  means  of  knowing  what  time  it  was.    Twice  during  the  experiment  and  at  the  
end,   respondents   were   asked   how  many   minutes   they   thought   had   passed   since   the  
experiment  began.     While   the  estimated  minutes  were  remarkably  accurate  on  average  
(the  mean   guess   for   how   long   the   experiment   lasted   in   total,   66.1  minutes,   was   very  
close   to   the   average   actual   duration   of   61.3  minutes,   presumably   because   anchored   to  
the   typical   one-­‐‑hour   duration   of   a   standard   experiment   in   the   lab),   33.7%   of   the  
respondents   under-­‐‑estimated   the   time.      This   group   of   people   compressed   time  
retrospectively,   and   therefore   may   be   more   likely   to   compress   their   perceptions   of  
distant  time  prospectively.  However,  there  would  seem  to  be  little  reason  to  expect  that  
this  would  be  a  direct  predictor  of  impatience  (discount  rate)  for  a  given  subjective  time  
frame  once  the  compression  is  taken  into  account.    Thus,  we  will  use  the  measure  of  bias  
in  estimating  recent  time  as  a  instrument  in  our  econometric  model.  
  
3.    THE  EXPERIMENT  
   We   recruited   subjects   to   participate   in   experiments   at   the   LSE   Behavioural  
Research  Lab  (BRL)  in  the  summer  of  2011.  All  subjects  were  recruited  from  volunteers  
within  the  BRL  mailing  list  (about  5,000  subjects),  which  includes  current  undergraduate  
and   post-­‐‑graduate   students   of   LSE   and   other   institutions   within   the   University   of  
London,   former   students,   members   of   staff,   and   non-­‐‑student   subjects.   A   total   of   178  
subjects,   from   different   background,   accepted   to   participate   to   the   experiment,   and  
signed  up  in  of  one  the  18  experimental  sessions.  All  experimental  sessions  were  run  at  
the  BRL.  There  were  no  other  eligibility  or  exclusion  criterion   to   select  participants.   In  
the  email  invitation,  subjects  were  not  informed  about  the  exact  nature  of  the  experiment  
that  would  be  conducted,  and  were  only  told  that:  the  experiment  would  last  about  an  
hour;  they  would  receive  £10  for  their  participation;  they  would  have  the  chance  to  get  
an  extra  payment  related  to  their  tasks.  Subjects  could  sign  up  to  any  of  four  one-­‐‑hour  
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sessions  taking  place  between  11  am  and  3  pm  at  every  working  day  of   the  week.  The  
experiment  received  full  approval  from  the  LSE  Research  Ethics  Committee.    
   Participants  were  brought  into  the  BRL  lab  in  small  groups.    Upon  arrival  at  the  lab,  
subjects   received  an  anonymous   four-­‐‑digit   ID  code  assigned  by   the  online  recruitment  
system   (SONA),   read   and   signed   an   informed   consent   form,   and   were   randomly  
assigned  to  a  corresponding  desk.  Subjects  were  asked  to  wear  a  sticker  tag  with  their  ID  
code,   as   well   as   their   assigned   desk   for   all   the   duration   of   the   experiment.   Also,   as  
mentioned,  all  timepieces  and  cell  phones  were  taken  from  participants  before  entering  
the  lab  and  kept  in  a  safe  room  during  the  all  experiment.  The  lab  is  in  the  basement  of  a  
building  at  LSE  with  florescent  lighting,  no  windows  and  no  clocks,  and  has  individual  
cubicles   divided   by   large   partitions   to   prevent   visual   contact   between   subjects.   In   the  
lab,  respondents  were  not  given  access  to  internet  at  their  desks,  and  were  given  verbal  
and  written  instructions  on  paper  forms.    
   The  experiment  progressed  in  three  phases.  Subjects  were  given  specific  instructions  
at  the  beginning  of  each  phase  and  answered  each  of  the  three  phases  separately.  Phase  
1  consisted  of  gathering  responses  to  a  comprehensive  questionnaire  on  socioeconomic  
and  health  characteristics,  subjective  well-­‐‑being  questions,  as  well  as  questions  about  the  
subjective  belief  about  how  far  away  various  durations  of  time  seemed  in  the  future.  
   In  particular,  the  subjective  time  questions  involved  asking  respondents  to  imagine,  
for  instance,  “a  day  in  four  weeks  from  now”.  Subjects  were  presented  a  slider  task  and  
told   that   in   the   line   presented   below,   the   left-­‐‑most   end   of   the   line   represented   “very  
short”  while   the  right-­‐‑most  of   the   line  represented  “very   long”.  Participants  were  then  
asked  to  place  a  mark  on  the  line  to  indicate  how  long  they  perceived  the  duration  to  be  
“between   now   and   one   day   four   weeks   from   now”.   The   time   frames   asked   were:  
tomorrow,  one  week,  four  weeks,  13  weeks,  26  weeks,  and  52  weeks.  (See  Appendix  A  
for   a   sample   question.)      Each   question  was   presented   separately   and   the   order   of   the  
different  time  frames  was  randomly  assigned  (beginning  with  the  four  weeks  time  frame  
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question).      The   text   of   the   question   explicitly   instructed   the   participants   to   consider  
where  they  would  place  the  mark  carefully  and  that  they  could  not  change  their  choice.    
   Phase   2   of   the   experiment   involved   playing   a   sound   of   constant   frequency   but  
different  volumes  to  assess  subject’s  subjective  perception  of  sound.  Subjects  were  asked  
to  rate  the  perceived  volume  of  each  sound  using  the  same  slider  task  described  above,  
which  was   also   employed   to  measure   other   individual   perceptions   such   as   brightness  
and   temperature   in   the   room.   For   each   individual   response,   the   length   between   the  
beginning   of   the   line   and   each  mark  was  measured,   in  millimeters.   As  mentioned,   in  
phase  2,  as  well  as  at  several  points  in  time  during  the  sessions,  subjects  were  also  asked  
how  much  time  they  thought  to  have  passed  from  the  beginning  of  the  experiment.  
   During  Phase  3  of   the  experiment  subjects  made  binary  choices  (108   in  total)  of  
when   they   would   like   to   receive   real   monetary   amounts   over   the   same   time   frames  
across  which   the   earlier   subjective   time  questions  were   asked.   In  particular,   following  
Harrison,  Lau,  and  Williams  (2002),  and  Andersen,  Harrison,  Lau,  and  Rutström  (2008),  
we   used   a   sequence   of   questions  within   a  multiple   price   list   (MPL)   test   to   elicit   time  
preferences.   In   each   question,   subjects   were   asked   to   choose   between   two   paired  
options.  Option  A  (the  SS  option)  gave  a  “principal”  amount  X   in  a  “sooner”  period  of  
time  t.  This  was  either  the  same  day,  or   the  day  immediately  following  the  day,  of   the  
experiment   (see  below).  On  the  other  hand,  Option  B  (the  LL  option)  gave  a  monetary  
amount  X+Y  in  a  future  period  of  time  t+T,  with  T  corresponding  to  each  of  the  specific  
time  frames  used  in  the  subjective  time  perception  test,  namely  one  day,  one  week,  four  
weeks,  13  weeks,  26  weeks,  and  52  weeks   from  the  “sooner”  period  of   time.  We  chose  
the  “principal”  amount  of  money  X  to  be  equal  to  £100,  a  relatively  large  nominal  value  
that   helps   i)  making   salient   the  perceived  differences   in   the   largest  delayed  payments  
even   for   short   time   horizons;   and   ii)   mitigating   distortions   due   to   subjects   possibly  
rounding  the  delayed  payments  up  to  the  nearest  dollar  (Andersen,  Harrison,  Lau,  and  
Rutström,   2011).   The   amounts   of   money   Y   where   chosen   in   a   way   that   a   subject  
switching  from  option  A  to  option  B  would  reveal   the  upper  and  lower  bounds  of  her  
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implicit  discount  for  the  time  interval  T.  In  particular,  monetary  amounts  Y  in  each  time  
frame  were   chosen   in   a  way   to   associate   to   each  pairs   of   options   a  minimum   implicit  
annual  discount  rate  –  assuming  objective  time  perception  -­‐‑    of  5,  10,  20,  30,  40,  50,  60,  70,  
80   percent,   respectively.   Amounts   for   the   LL   monetary   values   were   calculated   using  
simple  -­‐‑  rather  than  compounded  (e.g.  bi-­‐‑annually,  quarterly)  -­‐‑  annualized  discounting  
rates.   This   was   done   to   ensure   consistency   with   the   standard   practices   and   current  
regulations  within  the  banking  and  financial  sectors  in  the  UK  where,  typically,  interest  
rates  for  mortgages,  bonds,  and  credit  cards,  are  always  expressed  as  simple  annualized  
rates.    
There   were   thus   nine   SS-­‐‑LL   paired   options   questions   for   each   of   the   six   time  
frames   corresponding   to   the   ones   used   in   the   subjective   time   perception   test.   For   all  
subjects,  each  of  these  54  questions  was  repeated  twice:  half  of  the  108  questions  referred  
to  “now”  as  the  time  in  the  SS  option,  while  half  of  them  referred  to  “tomorrow”  as  the  
sooner   date.   That   is,   in   the   54   “front-­‐‑end   delay”   (FED)   choices   (Coller   and  Williams,  
1999),   both   the   SS   and   the   LL   rewards   were   shifted   forward   by   one   day.   Including  
questions   both   with   and   without   FED   allows   to   capture   genuine   occurrence   of   non-­‐‑
constant   discounting   rates:   by   exclusively   using   FED   choices,   in   fact,   one   may  
incorrectly  infer  exponential  discounting  simply  because  the  questions  design  is  unable  
to   record   non-­‐‑constant   discount   rates   occurring   within   the   FED   horizon   (Andersen,  
Harrison,   Lau,   and   Rutström,   2011).   As   already   discussed,   the  MPL   test   presented   to  
subjects  the  different  pairs  of  options  and  the  delay  frames  in  a  broken  sequence  and  a  
randomly  presented  order.    
In  addition   to   the  108   time  preferences  questions,   to   control   for   individual   risk  
preferences,  subjects  also  answered  3  sets  of  10  binary  lottery  questions  each.  Unlike  for  
the   time   preferences   questionnaire,   within   each   set   of   risk   preference   questions   the  
binary  choices  were  presented  in  an  unbroken,  ordered,  MPL,  with  the  probabilities  of  
the  high  prize  increasing  in  increments  of  0.1.    
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   Crucially,   subjects  were   told   in   advance   that   their   answers   to   the   questions   in   the  
MPL   tests   were   going   to   determine   their   final   payments   for   the   experiment.  
Respondents  were  informed  in  advance  that,  at  the  end  of  the  experiment,  one  of  the  108  
pairs  of  options  for  the  time  preferences,  and  one  of  the  30  pairs  of  lotteries  for  the  risk  
preferences,  would  be  randomly  selected  to  be  used  for  real  for  the  final  payment;  and  
that,   for   each   set   of   choices,   each   participant   in   the   session   had   a   5%   chance   to   be  
randomly   selected   to   actually   receive   the   payout   corresponding   to   the   option   (or   the  
outcome  of  the  lottery)  that  she  would  prefer  within  the  randomly  selected  pair.    
   To  maximize  the  transparency  and  credibility  of  the  payment  procedure,  all  random  
selections   took  place   physically   in   a   room  next   to   the   lab   in   front   of   all   subjects:   they  
consisted  in  the  draw  of  a  ball   from  a  bag  containing  either  108,  or  30,  numbered  ping  
pong  balls,  to  select  the  pair  of  option  relevant  for  the  payment,  and  then  selections  from  
a   bag   containing   20   balls,   one   for   each   desk   in   the   lab,   to   determine   whether   each  
participant  received   the  payment  or  not.  To  ensure   that  subjects  were  able   to  perfectly  
recall   and   check   their   preferred   choices   in   the   selected  pairs,   participants   retained   the  
handbook  with  their  actual  answers  during  all  the  random  selections  procedure  (and  of  
course  could  always  check  their  assigned  desk  from  the  sticker  tag).    
   Another   key   concern   in   time  preferences   experiments   is   to   ensure   that   transaction  
costs  and  credibility  of  payments  are  the  same  across  options  at  sooner  and  later  dates.  
To   achieve   this,   all   payments   for   the   time   preferences   questions  were   paid   out   using  
checks  not  payable  before   the  due  date,   so   that  every  subject   selected   for   the  payment  
had  to  make  a  trip  to  the  bank  to  collect  her  earnings,  regardless  of  the  payment  date.  To  
maximize  the  credibility  of  the  payments,  each  check  (from  the  largest  bank  in  the  UK)  
was  signed  by  the  experimenter  in  front  of  the  subjects,  and  secured  by  a  stamp  with  the  
recognized   logo   of   the   LSE   Behavioural   Research   Lab.   A   registry   of   all   present   and  
future  due  payments  was  also  signed  by  both  the  experimenter  and  each  selected  subject  
under   an   official   LSE   letterhead.   The   payments   based   on   the   outcome   of   the   selected  
lotteries  in  the  risk  preferences  questions,  as  well  as  the  £10  fixed  show-­‐‑up  fees,  were  all  
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paid  in  cash  at  the  end  of  each  session.  In  the  instructions,  participants  were  made  aware  
of  all  these  details  prior  to  their  choices.  
  
4.    ECONOMETRIC  MODEL  
   Assume   that   each   respondent   can   be   characterized   by   two   latent   variables:   the  
subjective   perception   of   time,   s*,   which   depends   on   an   innate   tendency   toward   time  
compression,   the   objective   time   frame   being   assessed,   and   potentially   other  
characteristics;   and   an   individual   discount   rate,   d*,   which   depends   on   individual  
characteristics.    Formally,  
(8)        
and  
(9)        
     
   Empirically,  we  observe  neither  s*  nor  d*.    Rather,  we  observe  some  individual  index  
of   subjective   time,   s   (as   based   on   the   millimeters   measures),   and   upper   and   lower  
bounds  on  the  latent  discount  rate,  dl  and  du.  As  for  the  latter,  ultimately  we  know  that  
an   individual  will   reveal   that   their   latent  discount   rate   is  between   the  upper  an   lower  
bounds  according  to  the  probability    
  
  
si* = Ziγ +ηi
di* = Xi β + εi







































































where  Φ(  .  )  represents  the  standard  normal  CDF;  ln  100  represents  the  £100  payout  that  
was  offered  as  the  immediate  payout  for  each  discount  choice;  FVmin  is  the  future  value  
offer   for   the   (implicit)   row   just   prior   to   the   respondent   switching   from  preferring   the  
immediate  to  the  future  payout;  FVmax   is   the  future  value  offered  for  the  (implicit)  row  
where  the  respondent  switches  to  preferring  the  future  option;  and  β  and  σ  parameters  
to  be  estimated.      
   One   key   complication   is   that,   to   define   the   upper   and   lower   bounds   correctly,  
requires  some  estimate  of  s*  -­‐‑  the  latent  number  of  subjective  days  the  respondent  feels  
when   confronted  with   some   specific   calendar   time   (e.g.,   one  week).      If  we   define   the  
inverse  function  of  (8)  as  f  -­‐‑1(t)  as  the  implied  number  of  subjective  days  associated  with  
every   objective   time   period,   t,   then   the   log   likelihood   function   for   the   individual  












































































































































































































We   will   use   an   iterated   maximum   likelihood   approach   to   estimating   the   parameter  
vector.    First,  we  need  an  estimate  for  f  -­‐‑1(t).      
   Recall   that   each   respondent   filled   in   distances   (in   mm)   on   a   defined   line   that  
represents  how  long  they  feel  each  calendar  time  frame  (one  day,  one  week,  four  weeks,  
thirteen  weeks,  26  weeks  and  52  weeks).    Each  person  uses  a  distinct  frame  for  this,  some  
using  most  of  the  line  and  some  using  much  less  of  the  line.    In  order  to  allow  pooling  of  
the  observations,  we  assume  that  individuals’  subjective  perception  of  one  day  is  equal  
to  the  actual  time  of  one  day  (or,  at  least  approximately  so).    We  then  divide  the  length  
of   the   line   for  each  response  by  the  one-­‐‑day   length  for  each  respondent.     This  has   two  
benefits.      First,   it   controls   for   individual   heterogeneity   in   scaling   by   normalizing   the  
distances   for   each   person’s   individual   scaling   behavior.      Second,   it   expresses   the  
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distances   for   each   time   period   in   subjective   one-­‐‑day   units.      Thus,   when   we   estimate  
Equation  (8)  in  terms  of  normalized  lengths,  we  are  estimating  the  relationship  between  
subjective  days  and  Zi.      
   Additionally,  given  that  our  specification  included  objective  days  and  objective  days  
squared  as  predictors,  once  we  have   the  estimated  parameters   γˆ   in  hand,   then  we  can  
generate  specific  values  of  s  =  f  -­‐‑1(t)  for  all  t  using  a  simple  quadratic  equation.  With  the  
estimates  of   f   -­‐‑1(t)   in  hand,   the  upper  and  lower  bounds  of   the   latent  discount  rates  for  
each  time  frame  for  each  person  were  calculated  and  the  primary  log  likelihood  function  
in  (10)  was  maximized.    Since  the  discount  bounds  were  based  on  predictive  values  for  f  
-­‐‑1(t),  standard  errors  for  the  β  from  (10)  were  estimated  via  a  bootstrap.  
   Furthermore,  subjects  in  our  experiments  could  have  opted  for  the  same  SS  option  in  
all   pairs   in   the   list,   indicating   that   their   implicit   discounting   rate   lay   beyond   the  
maximum  value  of  80%.    This  upper-­‐‑bound  censoring  for  those  respondents  is  built  into  
the   definition   of   the   likelihood   function   in   (10)   and   so   is   fully   accounted   for   in   our  
model.        
   Finally,   recall   that   our   experimental   design   broke   the   Coller   and   Williams-­‐‑style  
payoff   table  apart   for  each  of  our   six  delay   frames  and   randomly  presented  each   row.    
This   provided   respondents  with   the  maximum  opportunity   to   be   inconsistent,   if   their  
choices   actually  were   random   or   uncertain.   For   those   inconsistent   responses  we   have  
two  options.  First,  we  can  assume  that  the  lower  bound  to  the  latent  discount  rate  is  the  
implied  rate  for  the  row  before  the  first  switch  occurs  (if  the  table  was  constructed  in  a  
proper  ascending  order)  and  that  the  upper  bound  is  the  implied  rate  for  the  row  where  
the  final  switch  to  Option  B  takes  place.    In  this  way,  we  would  preserve  each  subject’s  
responses,   and  merely   have   broader   bands   on   some   subject’s   implied   discount   rates.    
The   second   option   is   to   just   drop   the   multiple   switches.   Our   empirical   analysis   has  
explored  both  options  and  results  are  qualitatively  very  similar  under  either  approach.    
The  model  is  more  precisely  estimated  for  the  second  approach,  however,  and  those  are  
the  results  that  we  will  present  here.      
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5.    RESULTS  
   As   for   the   question   on   “multiple-­‐‑switching”   consistency,   we   found   that   the   vast  
majority  of  our  subjects  were  consistent  in  their  responses:  around  11%  of  the  responses  
exhibited  multiple  switches,  that  is,  switched  from  Option  A  to  Option  B,  and  then  back  
to   Option   A   (and   eventually   then   back   again   to   Option   B).   We   see   this   as   tentative  
evidence  that  the  usually  high  frequencies  of  consistent  choices  in  (incentive-­‐‑compatible)  
time   preferences   experiments   are   not   a   mere   experimental   artifact   due   to   the   design  
feature   of   using   an   unbroken   ascending   order   of   questions   within   each   time   horizon  
block.  
   The  parameter  estimates  from  the  subjective  time  model  are  presented  in  Table  1.    In  
order   to   avoid   forcing   the   specific  Weber-­‐‑Fechner   log-­‐‑shaped   relationship  on   the  data  
(since   that   is   a   primary   hypothesis   being   tested   here)   we   included   the   delay   for   the  
payout  and  delay  squared,  rather  than  the  log  of  delay.    We  found  that  the  relationship  
is   strongly   non-­‐‑linear   in   a  manner   that   is   consistent  with  Weber-­‐‑Fechner.      (Indeed,   a  
version   of   the   model   where   delay   is   entered   as   the   natural   log   performs   essentially  
identically   to   this   specification,   both   in   terms   of   the   statistical   significance   of   logged  
delay  and  in  terms  of  R2.)      
   In  addition,   subjects  who  under-­‐‑estimated   the   length  of   the  experiment   in  minutes  
were   significantly  different   in   terms  of   their  prospective   subjective  perception  of   time.      
Intriguingly,   none   of   the   other   personal   characteristics   significantly   affected   the  
subjective  perception   of   time   (and  did  not  do   so   in   any  of   the   sensitivity   analyses  we  
ran).    This  is  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  non-­‐‑linear  subjective  time  perspective  is  
something   determined   on   a   fundamental   neuro-­‐‑physiological   level   (as   in   the  Weber-­‐‑
Fechner  law),  and  not  subject  to  much  cultural  or  environmental  modification.  
   In  order  to  generate  the  predictions  of  f  -­‐‑1(t)  needed  to  calculate  the  upper  and  lower  
bounds  of  the  discount  function,  we  estimated  a  limited  version  of  the  model  in  Table  1,  
with  only  the  delay  and  delay  squared  included,  then  solved  for  the  implied  number  of  
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subjective  days.    Figure  2  plots  the  average  results.    Note  the  similarities  to  the  revealed  
shape  of  the  subjective  days  function  with  the  Weber-­‐‑Fechner  hypothesis.    Perception  of  
subjective   time  appears   to  behave  much   like  perceptions  of  heat,   light  and  sound,  and  
closely  follow  a  log-­‐‑shaped  curve.  
   We  then  estimated  two  versions  of  the  discount  rate  model.    The  first  was  one  where  
the  upper  and  lower  bounds  were  calculated  using  objective  time  in,  as  in  Equation  (5).    
This  is  the  approach  taken  in  all  past  literature  estimating  individual  discount  rates.    The  
second   column   in   Table   2   are   the   results   from  maximizing   the   log   likelihood   in   (10)  
using  the  upper  and  lower  bounds  on  the  latent  discount  function  taking  subjective  time  
into  account.    In  addition  to  the  linear  and  squared  terms  for  the  delay  in  the  payout,  we  
also  included  an  indicator  variable  for  whether  the  SS  date  was  “today”  or  “tomorrow”  
to  account  for  the  front  end  delay  and  to  provide  a  more  precise  test  of  the  evolutionary  
motivation   for   quasi-­‐‑hyperbolic   preferences:   is   today   versus   tomorrow   different   than  
today   versus   any   other   time   frame?      Finally,   we   also   include   the   socio-­‐‑economic  
variables  that  were  also  included  in  our  subjective  time  model.  
   We  found  that   in  both  the  objective  time  and  subjective  time  versions  of  the  model  
the   implied   discount   factor   is   a   function   of   the   delay   in   the   payment,   as   would   be  
expected.   In   addition,   given   the   statistically   significant   parameter   of   the   “SS   date   is  
today”   variable,   there   is   strong   evidence   for   the   hypothesis   that   the   current   day  
discounting  differs   from  discounting   in   all   future  periods:   unlike  Andersen,  Harrison,  
Lau,  and  Rutström  (2011)  we  find  that  implicit  discount  rates  were  significantly  higher  
in  the  individual  responses  to  the  questions  without  front  end  delay.  
   Ultimately,   however,   we   want   to   know   whether   accounting   for   the   fact   that  
individuals  make  choices  based  on  subjective  time  rather  than  objective  time  can  explain  
the  hyperbolic  behavior  observed  in  most  existing  studies.    To  test  this,  we  predicted  the  
implied   discount   rate   for   each   person   in   each   time   frame   under   both   models.      The  
predicted  values   and   the   95%  confidence   intervals   are  presented   in  Tables   3a.   and  3b.  
and  in  Figures  3  and  4.     We  find  a  striking  difference  between  the  pattern  of  predicted  
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discount  rates  under  the  two  models.    When  (incorrectly)  assuming  that  people  respond  
to  objective  time,  we  find  discount  rates  that  are  high  (i.e.  above  57%  and  up  to  110%  per  
year,  consistently  with  most  other  estimates  of  individual  discount  rates  in  the  literature)  
and  that  exhibit  a  sharply  declining  rate  as  the  delay  increases.    This  is  most  easily  seen  
in  Figure  3.  
   However,  when  we   account   for   the   non-­‐‑linearities   in   each   respondent’s   subjective  
perception  of  time,  we  find  predicted  discount  rates  that  are:  1)  much  lower  than  usually  
found  in  the  hyperbolic  discounting  literature,  and  much  more  in  line  with  what  found  
by  Andersen,  Harrison,  Lau,  and  Rutström  (2011)  (i.e.  in  the  region  of  12-­‐‑22%  per  year)  
and,  ultimately,  with  market   interest  rates;  2)  higher  for  “today”  compared  to  all  other  
delays;   and   3)   statistically   indistinguishable   from  one   another   for   all   time  delays   after  
today.      Much  of  the  hyperbolic  pattern  evident  in  Figure  3  is  absent  from  Figure  4.  It  is  
true  that  as  a  point  estimate,  the  discount  rate  for  the  one-­‐‑day  delay  appears  higher  than  
for  the  one-­‐‑week  through  one-­‐‑year  delays.    But,  as  can  be  seen  in  Table  3b  and  Figure  4,  
all   the   discount   rate   point   estimates   for   time   periods   from   one  week   to   one   year   fall  
within  the  95%  confidence  intervals  of  each  other.    Thus,  like  Andersen,  Harrison,  Lau,  
and  Rutström  (2011),  we  cannot  reject  the  null  hypotheses  that  they  are  the  same.    
  
6.    DISCUSSION  AND  CONCLUSIONS  
Time  preferences  are   fundamental   to  optimal  dynamic  decision-­‐‑making,  and   likely  
to  have  a  major  impact  on  individual  decisions  with  regard  to  health  investments.    One  
of   the   most   common   findings   in   experimental   studies   assessing   individual   time  
preferences  is  that  discount  rates  are  higher  for  more  proximate  time  periods  and  lower  
for  more  distal  ones.    If  true  and  ubiquitous,  this  would  have  profound  implications  for  
individual   choices   –   and   indeed   for   the   possibility   of   learning   about   welfare   from  
observed  behavior.     Sharply  declining  discount  rates  with  increasing  time  delays,  often  
referred   to   as  hyperbolic   time  preferences  –   suggest   that  many  decisions  will   be   time-­‐‑
inconsistent.    Several  alternative  motives  have  been  proposed  to  explain  hyperbolic  time  
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preferences,   including   individual   impulsivity;   tempting   “visceral   factors”;      different  
cognitive   concreteness   in   visualizing   present   and   future   events;   sub-­‐‑additive  
discounting;  non-­‐‑linear  probability  weighting  in  the  perception  of  risk;  and  differences  
in  students  and  adults  subjects  pools.  
In  this  paper,  we  look  at  an  alternative  explanation  and  relate  to  the  new  branch  of  
the  behavioral  economics  literature  that  asks  whether  or  not  human  perception  of  time  is  
a  linear  mapping  from  calendar  time  (e.g.,  if  two  years  are  perceived  as  less  than  twice  
as  far  away  as  one  year).    If  it  is  not  the  case  that  the  subjective  perception  of  time  delays  
(at   least   prospectively)   are   identical   to   objective   calendar   time,   then  we   have  made   a  
math  error  when  calculating  discount  rates  in  empirical  studies  for  several  decades.  We  
explore   this  question  using  data   from  a   lab  experiment  conducted  at  LSE  whereby  we  
elicit  both  subjects’  perception  of  time  duration,  and  incentive-­‐‑compatible  inter-­‐‑temporal  
preferences  across  six   time  delays  ranging  from  one  day  to  one  year.     These  responses  
permit   us   to   estimate   implied  discount   rates  while   simultaneously   controlling   for   any  
non-­‐‑linearities  in  the  subjective  perception  of  time.    
Our  data  replicate  the  usual  finding  of  rapidly  falling  discount  rates  with  increasing  
delays   when   we   assume   subjective   time   is   the   same   as   calendar   time.      Our   data,  
however   reject   the   equivalence   between   subjective   and   calendar   time,   and   when   we  
adjust   for   the   difference   between   calendar   delay   and   perceived   delay,   we   find   very  
different   patterns   of   discount   rates:  while   discounting   rates   based   on   “objective   time”  
replicate  the  usual  hyperbolic  preferences,  the  curve  of  the  discounting  factors  obtained  
from  “subjective  time”  does  not  exhibit  much  of  the  hyperbolic  pattern  and,  if  anything,  
resembles   the   shape   of   a   quasi-­‐‑hyperbolic   function.   Accounting   for   individual  
perception   of   time   thus   drives   a   wedge   between   time   discounting   and   “pure”   time  
preferences.  We  find  that  there  remains  a  “first  day”  effect  of  delay  on  time  preferences  
–   where   respondents   appear   to   have   genuinely   higher   impatience   when   choosing  
between   today  and   tomorrow,  or   today  and  any   further  point   in   the   future   –  but   that  
discount   rates   for  delays   from  one  week   to  one  year  are   statistically   indistinguishable.  
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Thus,  we   argue   that   there   is   good   reason   to   suspect   that  much   of   the   hyperbolic-­‐‑like  
discount  rate  estimates  in  the  literature  is  a  case  of  “getting  the  maths  wrong”.    
Our   results   can   be   related   to   the   recent   findings   by  Andersen,  Harrison,   Lau,   and  
Rutström  (2011)  who  also  find  no  significant  evidence  of  hyperbolic  discounting  in  most  
their   empirical   specifications.   An   exception   is   their   Weibull   specification,   which,   as  
noticed,   is   conceptually   close   to   our   discounting   rate   adjusted   for   individual   time  
perception:   in   that   case,  discount   rates  were   found   to  be   slightly  decreasing,   although  
the  hypothesis  of  exponential  discounting  could  not  be  rejected.  Our  findings  differ  from  
Andersen,  Harrison,  Lau,  and  Rutström  (2011)  mainly   in   that,  even  after  correcting  for  
subjective  time  perception,  we  find  a  significantly  higher  discounting  for  the  very  “first  
day”.  This  result  could  be  due  to  differences  in  the  studies’  design  (e.g.  they  use  2  weeks  
as  a  shortest  time  horizon,  together  with  a  1-­‐‑month  FED,  while  we  directly  include  1-­‐‑day  
time   horizons),   or   by   obvious   differences   in   the   students-­‐‑adults,   or   the  UK-­‐‑Denmark,  
subjects  pools.  
We  leave  to  further  research  the  intriguing  questions  of  whether  the  Weber-­‐‑Fechner-­‐‑
shaped   curvature   of   the   individual   perception   of   time   may   be   related   to   decreasing  
impatience  and  other  forms  of  non-­‐‑stationary  time  preferences  (Prelec,  2004;  Bleichrodt,  
Rodhe,   and   Wakker,   2009),   or   to   non-­‐‑linear   probability   weighting   and   sub-­‐‑
proportionality,  which   have   also   been   found   to   associate  with   hyperbolic   discounting  
(Epper,   Fehr-­‐‑Duda   et   al.   2011).   Other   questions   which   deserve   further   explicit  
investigation  are  whether  subjective  time  perception  is  associated  to  other  self-­‐‑reported  
personality  measures  commonly  used  in  surveys  (such  as  impulsiveness,  self-­‐‑control,  or  
patience)  or  to  non-­‐‑personality  factors  such  as  age  or  individual  cognitive  skills.    
In   the   meanwhile,   our   findings   are   of   significant   practical   importance.      Few  
economic   decisions   (other   than,   perhaps,   whether   to   stop   daily   consumption   of   an  
addictive  good)  are  made  over   the   time   frame  of  “today”  compared   to   later.  For   those  
decisions   that   are,   genuinely   declining   discounting   rates   may   reflect   underlying   self-­‐‑
control   problems.   Most   economic   activities,   however,   –   from   paying   utility   bills   to  
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purchasing  groceries,  from  planning  savings  and  retirement,  to  making  plans  to  attend  a  
concert   –   involve   committing   to   resource   allocations  where   the   consumption   tradeoffs  
are  delayed  by  more  than  a  day  in  the  future.  For  these  activities  the  detrimental  impact  
of   time-­‐‑inconsistencies   may   be   practically   of   a   lesser   relevance   than   the   effect   of  
subjective  time  compression.  Policy  interventions  which  are  designed  on  the  assumption  
that,  in  our  inter-­‐‑temporal  decisions,  we  are  always  time-­‐‑inconsistent  -­‐‑  such  as  the  ones  
involving   commitment   devices,   front-­‐‑end   monetary   incentives,   and   pre-­‐‑commitment  
defaults   -­‐‑  may  miss  part   of   the  broader  picture.  Behavioral   scientists   informing  policy  
decision-­‐‑making   can   fruitfully   explore   future   interventions   based   on   alternative  
psychological  motives  and  mechanisms  -­‐‑  such  as  subjective  time  perception-­‐‑  which  can  
potentially  underpin  apparent  inconsistencies  in  inter-­‐‑temporal  choices.    
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Figure  1:  Example  of  discounting  elicitation  test  
  
Source:  Coller,  M.  and  Williams,  M.B.  (1999).  
  




















perception of time 
 b/t 
Delay for payout, in days 0.19*** 
 (10.06) 
Delay for payout, squared -0.00026*** 
 (-7.14) 
Respondent under-estimates length of experiment 8.90** 
 (2.35) 
Respondent is over age 25 -1.67 
 (-0.60) 
Respondent is female -1.54 
 (-0.63) 
Respondent is Hindu 4.20 
 (0.65) 
Respondent is Muslim 2.47 
 (0.64) 
Respondent is active in religion 1.93 
 (0.54) 
Respondent has some savings -2.01 
 (-0.61) 
Respondent will need savings in coming year 0.79 
 (0.26) 
How satisfied with life overall  0.73 
 (0.78) 
Respondent has good or better health 0.18 
 (0.07) 









Table 2: Interval Regression Model Coefficients for Discount - no multiple switchers 





 b/t b/t 
   
SS date is today 0.15** 0.067*** 
 (2.53) (4.66) 
Delay for payout, in days -0.0025***  
 (-4.84)  
Delay for payout, squared 0.0000040***  
 (3.00)  
Predicted subjective days  -0.00081*** 
  (-3.86) 
Predicted subjective days, squared  0.0000022*** 
  (2.91) 
Respondent is over age 25 0.0063 0.0078 
 (0.16) (0.64) 
Respondent is female -0.057* 0.018* 
 (-1.70) (1.66) 
Respondent is Hindu 0.053 -0.011 
 (0.92) (-0.64) 
Respondent is Muslim 0.055 0.035** 
 (0.95) (2.02) 
Respondent is active in religion 0.040 -0.024* 
 (0.96) (-1.86) 
Respondent has some savings -0.11*** -0.0058 
 (-2.72) (-0.50) 
Respondent will need savings in coming year -0.0070 0.021** 
 (-0.20) (2.05) 
How satisfied with life overall  -0.014 0.0016 
 (-1.19) (0.42) 
Respondent has good or better health 0.058 0.0046 
 (1.59) (0.45) 
Respondent's expected years of life 0.0026* -0.00062 
 (1.77) (-1.31) 
Constant 0.92*** 0.19*** 
 (6.00) (3.51) 
Lnsigma   
Constant -0.87*** -2.39*** 
 (-22.24) (-44.09) 
Observations 887 744 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3a: Predicted Discount Rate Assuming Objective Time, no multiple switchers 
(1) (2) (3) 




95% CI Upper 
Bound 
Mean Mean Mean 
1 0.970 1.109 1.247 
7 0.835 0.953 1.072 
28 0.789 0.901 1.012 
91 0.660 0.770 0.879 
182 0.520 0.635 0.750 
365 0.449 0.570 0.691 
Observations 887 887 887 
Table 3b: Predicted Discount Rate Assuming Subjective Time, no multiple switchers 
(1) (2) (3) 




95% CI Upper 
Bound 
Mean Mean Mean 
1 0.192 0.228 0.265 
7 0.117 0.153 0.189 
28 0.0988 0.135 0.170 
91 0.0882 0.124 0.160 
182 0.0885 0.124 0.160 
365 0.0858 0.123 0.160 
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Imagine  a  day  4  weeks  from  now.  
On  the  below  line,  the  left-­‐‑most  end  of  the  line  represents  “Very  short”,  and  the  right-­‐‑most  end  of  
the  line  represents  “Very  long”.    
Please   place   a  mark   on   the   line   to   indicate   how   long   you   consider   the  duration   to   be  between  
today  and  one  day  4  weeks  from  now.    
Once  you  have  done  your  choice,  you  cannot  go  back  and  change  it.  If  you  make  a  mistake,  please  
call  immediately  the  experimenter.  
Very  short  Very  long  
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 Receive £  Receive £    
1 100 Today 100.01 Tomorrow A B 
2 100 Today 101.54 In 1 week A B 
3 100 Today 100.76 In 4 weeks A B 
4 100 Today 117.5 In 13 weeks 
(3 months) 
A B 
5 100 Today 110 In 26 weeks 
(6 months) 
A B 
6 100 Today 160 In 52 weeks 
(1 year) 
A B 
7 100 Today 100.08 Tomorrow A B 
8 100 Today 100.96 In 1 week A B 
9 100 Today 103.08 In 4 weeks A B 
10 100 Today 110 In 13 weeks 
(3 months) 
A B 
11 100 Today 125 In 26 weeks 
(6 months) 
A B 
12 100 Today 130 In 52 weeks 
(1 year) 
A B 
13 100 Today 100.16 Tomorrow A B 
14 100 Today 100.38 In 1 week A B 
15 100 Today 105.38 In 4 weeks A B 
16 100 Today 102.5 In 13 weeks 
(3 months) 
A B 
17 100 Today 140 In 26 weeks 
(6 months) 
A B 
18 100 Today 105 In 52 weeks 
(1 year) 
A B 
19 100 Today 100.03 Tomorrow A B 
20 100 Today 101.35 In 1 week A B 





















 Receive £  Receive £    
22 100 Today 115 In 13 weeks 
(3 months) 
A B 
23 100 Today 115 In 26 weeks 
(6 months) 
A B 
24 100 Today 150 In 52 weeks 
(1 year) 
A B 
25 100 Today 100.05 Tomorrow A B 
26 100 Today 101.15 In 1 week A B 
27 100 Today 102.31 In 4 weeks A B 
28 100 Today 112.5 In 13 weeks 
(3 months) 
A B 
29 100 Today 120 In 26 weeks 
(6 months) 
A B 
30 100 Today 140 In 52 weeks 
(1 year) 
A B 
31 100 Today 100.1 Tomorrow A B 
32 100 Today 100.77 In 1 week A B 
33 100 Today 103.85 In 4 weeks A B 
34 100 Today 107.5 In 13 weeks 
(3 months) 
A B 
35 100 Today 130 In 26 weeks 
(6 months) 
A B 
36 100 Today 120 In 52 weeks 
(1 year) 
A B 
37 100 Today 100.14 Tomorrow A B 
38 100 Today 100.48 In 1 week A B 
39 100 Today 104.62 In 4 weeks A B 
40 100 Today 105 In 13 weeks 
(3 months) 
A B 
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Receive £ Receive £ 
42 100 Today 110 In 52 weeks 
(1 year) 
A B 
43 100 Today 100.19 Tomorrow A B 
44 100 Today 100.19 In 1 week A B 
45 100 Today 106.15 In 4 weeks A B 
46 100 Today 101.25 In 13 weeks 
(3 months) 
A B 
47 100 Today 102.5 In 26 weeks 
(6 months) 
A B 
48 100 Today 180 In 52 weeks 
(1 year) 
A B 
49 100 Today 100.22 Tomorrow A B 
50 100 Today 100.09 In 1 week A B 
51 100 Today 100.38 In 4 weeks A B 
52 100 Today 120 In 13 weeks 
(3 months) 
A B 
53 100 Today 105 In 26 weeks 
(6 months) 
A B 








Receive £ Receive £ 
55 100 Tomorrow 100.22 Day after 
tomorrow 
A B 
56 100 Tomorrow 100.09 In 1 day 
and 1 week 
A B 



















61 100 Tomorrow 100.14 Day after 
tomorrow 
A B 
62 100 Tomorrow 100.48 In 1 day 
and 1 week 
A B 



















67 100 Tomorrow 100.05 Day after 
tomorrow 
A B 
68 100 Tomorrow 101.15 In 1 day 
and 1 week 
A B 
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Receive £ Receive £ 



















73 100 Tomorrow 100.19 Day after 
tomorrow 
A B 
74 100 Tomorrow 100.19 In 1 day 
and 1 week 
A B 



















79 100 Tomorrow 100.16 Day after 
tomorrow 
A B 
80 100 Tomorrow 100.38 In 1 day 
and 1 week 
A B 














Receive £ Receive £ 










85 100 Tomorrow 100.1 Day after 
tomorrow 
A B 
86 100 Tomorrow 100.77 In 1 day 
and 1 week 
A B 



















91 100 Tomorrow 100.08 Day after 
tomorrow 
A B 
92 100 Tomorrow 100.96 In 1 day 
and 1 week 
A B 



















Receive £ Receive £ 





97 100 Tomorrow 100.01 Day after 
tomorrow 
A B 
98 100 Tomorrow 101.35 In 1 day 
and 1 week 
A B 



















103 100 Tomorrow 100.03 Day after 
tomorrow 
A B 
104 100 Tomorrow 101.54 In 1 day 
and 1 week 
A B 


















CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1254 Marc J. Melitz 
Stephen J. Redding 
Missing Gains from Trade? 
1253 Charlotte Cabane 
Andrew E. Clark 
Childhood Sporting Activities and Adult 
Labour-Market Outcomes 
1252 Andrew E. Clark 
Emanuela D'Angelo 
Upward Social Mobility, Well-being and 
Political Preferences: Evidence from the 
BHPS 
1251 Juliano Assunção, 
João Paulo Pessoa  
Leonardo Rezende 
Flex Cars and Competition in Ethanol and 
Gasoline Retail Markets 
1250 Oriana Bandiera 
Andrea Prat  
Raffaella Sadun 
Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from 
CEOs at Work 
1249 Vincent Sterk 
Silvana Tenreyro 
The Transmission of Monetary Policy 
Operations through Redistributions and 
Durable Purchases 
1248 Guy Michaels 
Ferdinand Rauch 
Resetting the Urban Network: 117-2012 
1247 Thiemo Fetzer 
Oliver Pardo 
Amar Shanghavi 
An Urban Legend?! Power Rationing, 
Fertility and its Effects on Mothers 
1246 João Paulo Pessoa 
John Van Reenen 
Decoupling of Wage Growth and 
Productivity Growth? Myth and Reality 
1245 Richard Layard 




What Predicts a Successful Life? A Life-
Course Model of Well-Being 
1244 Benjamin Faber Trade Integration, Market Size and 
Industrialization: Evidence from China’s 
National Trunk Highway System 
1243 Scott R Baker 
Nicholas Bloom 
Does Uncertainty Reduce Growth? Using 
Disasters as Natural Experiments 
1242 Jo Blanden 
Paul Gregg 
Lindsey Macmillan 
Intergenerational Persistence in Income and 
Social Class: The Impact of Within-Group 
Inequality 
1241 Richard Murphy 
Felix Weinhardt 
The Importance of Rank Position 
1240 Alex Eble 
Peter Boone 
Diana Elbourne 
Risk and Evidence of Bias in Randomized 
Controlled Trials in Economics 




Mental Illness and Unhappiness 
1238 Laura Jaitman 
Stephen Machin 
Crime and Immigration: New Evidence from 
England and Wales 
1237 Ross Levine 
Yona Rubinstein 
Smart and Illicit: Who Becomes an 
Entrepreneur and Does it Pay? 




The Objective Benefits of Subjective Well-
Being 
1235 Pascal Michaillat 
Emmanuel Saez 
A Model of Aggregate Demand and 
Unemployment 
1234 Jerónimo Carballo, 
Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano 
Christian Volpe Martincus 
The Buyer Margins of Firms’ Exports 
1233 Daniel Fujiwara A General Method for Valuing Non-Market 
Goods Using Wellbeing Data: Three-Stage 
Wellbeing Valuation 
1232 Holger Breinlich 
Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano 
Jonathan R. W. Temple 
Regional Growth and Regional Decline 
1231 Michalis Drouvelis 
Nattavudh Powdthavee 
Are Happier People Less Judgmental of Other 
People's Selfish Behaviors? Laboratory 
Evidence from Trust and Gift Exchange 
Games 




Unemployment and Domestic Violence: 
Theory and Evidence 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel 020 7955 7673 Fax 020 7404 0612 
Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk Web site http://cep.lse.ac.uk  
